Is TLS Fast Yet?

https://istlsfastyet.com/ Published on Jul 24, 2014 “TLS has exactly one performance problem: not enough sites are using it. Everything else can and will be optimized. A hands on look at how to achieve 1-RTT handshakes, eliminate validation latency, and more.” Slides: bit.ly/fastTLS by Ilya Grigorik ( @ google) . See the bottom of the page on Nginx configs on how to improve TLS performance

CRIME (security exploit) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRIME_(security_exploit) from http://tech.slashdot.org/story/13/07/09/1455200/ It works like this. You visit a site that has malicious JavaScript which sends a HTTPS request to some site (like your bank). This request will include whatever known plain-text that the JavaScript wants to send, plus any cookies you have stored for the target site, possibly including authentication cookies. If the plain text happens to match part of that authentication cookie, then the compressed headers will be smaller than if they if they don’t match. If the attacker can monitor this encrypted traffic and see the sizes of the packets, then they can systematically select the known plaintext to slowly learn the value of the authentication cookie. This can be done today in about half an hour. And the attack setup is feasible - consider a public WiFi access point that requires you to keep a frame open in order to use their WiFi. This gives them both the MITM and JavaScript access needed to perfo… ...

CRIME (security exploit) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRIME_(security_exploit) from http://tech.slashdot.org/story/13/07/09/1455200/ It works like this. You visit a site that has malicious JavaScript which sends a HTTPS request to some site (like your bank). This request will include whatever known plain-text that the JavaScript wants to send, plus any cookies you have stored for the target site, possibly including authentication cookies. If the plain text happens to match part of that authentication cookie, then the compressed headers will be smaller than if they if they don’t match. If the attacker can monitor this encrypted traffic and see the sizes of the packets, then they can systematically select the known plaintext to slowly learn the value of the authentication cookie. This can be done today in about half an hour. And the attack setup is feasible - consider a public WiFi access point that requires you to keep a frame open in order to use their WiFi. This gives them both the MITM and JavaScript access needed to perfo… ...

SSL termination: stunnel, nginx & stud | Vincent Bernat

http://vincent.bernat.im/en/blog/2011-ssl-benchmark.html Interesting test results comparing and analyzing SSL performance. Using right combination of software and proper tunning, you can get up to 14000 TPS (re-shake every 80 requests) on HP DL 380 G7, with two Xeon L5630 (running at 2.13GHz for a total of 8 cores), without hyperthreading, using a 2.6.39 kernel (HZ is set to 250) and two Intel 82576 NIC.

SSL termination: stunnel, nginx & stud | Vincent Bernat

http://vincent.bernat.im/en/blog/2011-ssl-benchmark.html Interesting test results comparing and analyzing SSL performance. Using right combination of software and proper tunning, you can get up to 14000 TPS (re-shake every 80 requests) on HP DL 380 G7, with two Xeon L5630 (running at 2.13GHz for a total of 8 cores), without hyperthreading, using a 2.6.39 kernel (HZ is set to 250) and two Intel 82576 NIC.

Understanding the TLS Renegotiation Attack - Educated Guesswork

http://www.educatedguesswork.org/2009/11/understanding_the_tls_renegoti.html explains Marsh Ray’s attack in details, pls patch to fix the TLS protocol