The Web never forgets: Persistent tracking mechanisms in the wild
https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/persistent/index.html
https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/persistent/index.html
http://blog.risk.io/2013/08/stop-fixing-all-the-things-bsideslv/ Recent parer shows that it make sense to focus only on vulns that have ready exploits in metasploit and exploitdb
http://blog.risk.io/2013/08/stop-fixing-all-the-things-bsideslv/ Recent parer shows that it make sense to focus only on vulns that have ready exploits in metasploit and exploitdb
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/advisory/2876146 Recent security hole in wifi authentication – fix requires a roll-out of PKI (i.e. certificate-based auth ) for all devices . (Great ?! )
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/advisory/2876146 Recent security hole in wifi authentication – fix requires a roll-out of PKI (i.e. certificate-based auth ) for all devices . (Great ?! )
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRIME_(security_exploit) from http://tech.slashdot.org/story/13/07/09/1455200/ It works like this. You visit a site that has malicious JavaScript which sends a HTTPS request to some site (like your bank). This request will include whatever known plain-text that the JavaScript wants to send, plus any cookies you have stored for the target site, possibly including authentication cookies. If the plain text happens to match part of that authentication cookie, then the compressed headers will be smaller than if they if they don’t match. If the attacker can monitor this encrypted traffic and see the sizes of the packets, then they can systematically select the known plaintext to slowly learn the value of the authentication cookie. This can be done today in about half an hour. And the attack setup is feasible - consider a public WiFi access point that requires you to keep a frame open in order to use their WiFi. This gives them both the MITM and JavaScript access needed to perfo… ...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRIME_(security_exploit) from http://tech.slashdot.org/story/13/07/09/1455200/ It works like this. You visit a site that has malicious JavaScript which sends a HTTPS request to some site (like your bank). This request will include whatever known plain-text that the JavaScript wants to send, plus any cookies you have stored for the target site, possibly including authentication cookies. If the plain text happens to match part of that authentication cookie, then the compressed headers will be smaller than if they if they don’t match. If the attacker can monitor this encrypted traffic and see the sizes of the packets, then they can systematically select the known plaintext to slowly learn the value of the authentication cookie. This can be done today in about half an hour. And the attack setup is feasible - consider a public WiFi access point that requires you to keep a frame open in order to use their WiFi. This gives them both the MITM and JavaScript access needed to perfo… ...
http://weis2007.econinfosec.org/papers/29.pdf Old (2007 ) paper by Charlie Miller about trading of 0-day exploits
http://weis2007.econinfosec.org/papers/29.pdf Old (2007 ) paper by Charlie Miller about trading of 0-day exploits
http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php/topic,19310.0.html original PRISM docs from wikileaks