Stop Fixing All The Things – Our BSidesLV Talk | The Risk I/O Blog
http://blog.risk.io/2013/08/stop-fixing-all-the-things-bsideslv/ Recent parer shows that it make sense to focus only on vulns that have ready exploits in metasploit and exploitdb
http://blog.risk.io/2013/08/stop-fixing-all-the-things-bsideslv/ Recent parer shows that it make sense to focus only on vulns that have ready exploits in metasploit and exploitdb
http://blog.risk.io/2013/08/stop-fixing-all-the-things-bsideslv/ Recent parer shows that it make sense to focus only on vulns that have ready exploits in metasploit and exploitdb
http://weis2007.econinfosec.org/papers/29.pdf Old (2007 ) paper by Charlie Miller about trading of 0-day exploits
http://weis2007.econinfosec.org/papers/29.pdf Old (2007 ) paper by Charlie Miller about trading of 0-day exploits
http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php/topic,19310.0.html original PRISM docs from wikileaks
http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php/topic,19310.0.html original PRISM docs from wikileaks
http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~sergey/langsec/ The Language-theoretic approach (LANGSEC) regards the Internet insecurity epidemic as a consequence of ad hoc programming of input handling at all layers of network stacks, and in other kinds of software stacks. LANGSEC posits that the only path to trustworthy software that takes untrusted inputs is treating all valid or expected inputs as a formal language, and the respective input-handling routines as a recognizer for that language. The recognition must be feasible, and the recognizer must match the language in required computation power. ...
http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~sergey/langsec/ The Language-theoretic approach (LANGSEC) regards the Internet insecurity epidemic as a consequence of ad hoc programming of input handling at all layers of network stacks, and in other kinds of software stacks. LANGSEC posits that the only path to trustworthy software that takes untrusted inputs is treating all valid or expected inputs as a formal language, and the respective input-handling routines as a recognizer for that language. The recognition must be feasible, and the recognizer must match the language in required computation power. ...
http://prisms.cs.umass.edu/cs660sp11/papers/rwash-homesec-soups10-final.pdf paper that describes folk mental models on computer security: about “viruses” and “hackers”. interesting read
http://prisms.cs.umass.edu/cs660sp11/papers/rwash-homesec-soups10-final.pdf paper that describes folk mental models on computer security: about “viruses” and “hackers”. interesting read